Wildfire Response and Recovery Resources for the Water Sector

The Water Quality Control Division has resources available to assist your county, municipalities, communities, and water and wastewater systems through wildfire response and recovery processes. 

General resources

• CO - Post Fire Playbook: updated May 2025. 
• After the Flames: general community resource. 
• CoWARN: Use CoWARN if you need to, update your profile so you receive activations, and utilize the message board to discuss post-fire treatment issues, etc. 

Best practices to protect public health and comply with regulatory requirements

Communicate with the division if your water or wastewater system’s source water, collections system, treatment, or distribution system may be impacted by a wildfire. 

Non-emergency concerns for planning and response: 

• Drinking water - communicate with your compliance specialist. 
• Wastewater - communicate with the division’s Lead Wastewater Engineer - David Kurz  (303)692-6298.

Emergency concerns: 

• Immediate challenges with treatment, distribution, and collections, call the department’s 24-hour Incident Report Line - 1-877-518-5608
• Drinking water - Please consult the Pressure Loss Response Guidance for additional information on pressure loss/outages. 
• If any portion of your distribution system was burned by the fire, please consult the WQCD acute team regarding flushing, sampling, and potential advisories. Contact Lead Drinking Water Engineer, Chelsea Cotton, chelsea.cotton@state.co.us, and the acute team email inbox, cdphe.wqacutes@state.co.us 
• If any portion of your distribution system loses pressure for any reason, such as wildfire impacts to infrastructure, power outage or intentional shutdown due to evacuation, please call the department’s 24-hour Incident Report Line - 1-877-518-5608.
• If you are a surface water system and have filtration concerns, including but not limited to, if you are unable to meet your microbial removal or are getting close to exceeding your turbidity limits, following a wildfire, please call your compliance specialist. If you are calling outside of normal business hours please call the Incident Report Line. 

Best management practices for immediate response: 

Communicate the following information to the incident management team: locations of critical infrastructure, special considerations or hazards such as high-voltage power, chlorinators, source water protection areas.  If you don’t have a direct line of communication with the incident management team, please reach out to our 24-hour report line and the department emergency management team will assist you with getting the correct point of contact. 

• Evacuation 
• Pay attention to all emergency alerts, instructions, and evacuate immediately if asked by authorities.
• Turn off air conditioning or air circulation systems.
• Detach any electrical garage doors.
• Have an N-95 or other type of respirator available, if possible, to limit exposure to smoke and other toxic fumes.
• Re-entry
• Consult with the local incident management team before any utility personnel re-enter the facility. 
• Minimize the risk of inhaling dust particles by wetting debris.
• If returning from evacuation, remember that dangers could still exist for personnel such as hot spots, charred and fallen trees, downed power lines, smoldering and falling debris, sinkholes, mud, and landslides, etc.
• Resources
• EPA’s Incident Action Checklist 
• Tier 1 public notice instructions - Use for boil or bottled water advisory once you receive the advisory for the division.
• National Environmental Health Association - WILDFIRE RESPONSE Guide for Environmental Public Health Professionals

Best management practices for long-term recovery:  

• Purdue University - Addressing Contamination of Drinking Water Distribution Systems from Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs) After Wildfires
• Center for Disease Control - Private Wells after a Wildfire
• Boulder County Health Department - Fire Recovery Resources for Private Wells and Septic 

➽ Kyra Gregory Drinking Water Training Specialist 

➽ Chelsea Cotton, P.E. Lead Drinking Water Engineer

Wildfire Planning and Recovery Playbook - 2025 Updates!

After a wet spring and variable monsoon season, wildfire season is again upon us in Colorado. As many of you are aware, our public water systems and local communities face a diverse and significant array of challenges when planning, responding, and recovering from wildfires. The best time to start planning for wildfires is right now, in advance of fires.

The Water Quality Control Division (WQCD), along with many state, federal, and local partners, have released a revised and updated version of our Wildfire Planning and Recovery Playbook, available on our Source Water Assessment and Protection website.  Several authors also hosted a webinar on July 25th, with the slide presentation and a recording available.

Pre-fire planning, response, and recovery is a team effort, and requires coordination across multiple jurisdictions, and administrative and physical boundaries. Each community wildfire event may present a unique set of circumstances that must be understood and conveyed to effectively navigate wildfire incidents. The centerpiece of the playbook is the comprehensive critical contacts list, outlining necessary points of contact along with each representative’s roles and responsibilities within the planning, response, and recovery process. Below is an example of the critical contacts list contained in the playbook.

The playbook also provides various actionable steps through each phase of the fire cycle, from planning through recovery.  Examples include identifying your values at risk, forming a recovery group and identifying partners, understanding prefire actions and resources, and roles and responsibilities of partners throughout the different phases of a wildfire incident. The playbook also includes 2 full pages of links to additional resources, including a list of funding programs and technical assistance partners.

The playbook is concise, usable, and accessible. The target audience for this playbook is public water systems, municipalities, counties, and tribes. The updated version reflects lessons learned from recent urban and suburban wildfires and the new Wildfire Ready Watersheds framework from the Colorado Water Conservation Board. Please contact the source water protection team at cdphe.wqswap@state.co.us with any questions or for more information.

➽ Robert Murphy, CPSS, Source Water Protection Program Coordinator

➽ Kristen Hughes, Source Water Protection Specialist

➽ John Duggan, Source Water & Emerging Contaminants Unit Manager

Risk and Resilience Assessments and Emergency Response Plans

While attending the annual conference of the Association of State Drinking Water Administrators (ASDWA), an organization consisting of my counterparts across the U.S. and including territories, presentations were given about drinking water emergencies that generated national attention. These included the train derailment in East Palestine, Ohio and boil water orders in Jackson, Mississippi. At a previous conference I gave a talk about the Marshall Wildfires. I am sure most of us are aware of the tragic Lahaina, Hawaii wildfire that struck Maui earlier this year.

Extreme events like these are exceedingly difficult to consider and plan/prepare for. But there are requirements in the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) for utilities to assess their vulnerability and risks, and to develop emergency response plans. These requirements came in with America’s Water Infrastructure Act (AWIA) that was signed into law in October 2018. AWIA Section 2013 specifies that all Community Water Systems with populations greater than 3,300 must conduct Risk and Resilience Assessment (RRAs) and Emergency Response Plans (ERPs). These documents need to be reviewed and updated at least every five years. Since this provision of SDWA is directly implemented by EPA, water systems must certify directly to EPA every five years that they have completed these required activities. The initial RRA certifications were due to EPA from March 2020 to June 2021 depending on systems size, so the first five-year updates are due from March 2025 to June 2026. For more information about upcoming review deadlines and requirements please visit the EPA’s RRA/ERP website. The ERP is intended to be developed in a way that addresses system-specific elements based on its RRA, so these certifications are due six months after the RRA certifications.

The RRA needs to address the following components:

• Risks from malevolent acts and natural hazards
• Traditional water system infrastructure resilience including electronic, computer, or other automated systems (including the security of such systems) utilized by the system
• Financial infrastructure
• System monitoring, operations and maintenance
• Chemical use, storage and handling

Note that item two above essentially includes cybersecurity. EPA has a Vulnerability Self-Assessment Tool (VSAT) to help water systems complete their RRA. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the Colorado Information Analysis Center (CIAC)also provide numerous tools to help systems address the cyber components of the RRA.

After completing the RRA, the ERP needs to be developed and describe strategies, resources, plans and procedures utilities will use to prepare for and respond to emergency incidents. The incidents can be natural or human-caused and range from line breaks to major disasters like floods or wildfires. The ERP needs to specifically address:

• Strategies and resources to improve resilience including physical security and cybersecurity.
• Emergency response strategies and resources
• Proactive approaches to lessen the impact of emergency incidents
• Strategies to help detect malevolent acts or natural hazards that could harm the system

Water systems should coordinate with local emergency planning agencies and must retain copies of their RRA and ERP.

This SDWA provision is not part of state primacy, but is overseen by EPA. To date, EPA has primarily overseen compliance with these requirements via ensuring that systems have submitted their certification. However, going forward EPA is conducting inspections at water systems across the U.S. and soon in Colorado to evaluate compliance with these requirements and help systems become better prepared to prevent emergencies, lessen their severity and respond.

We all know that emergency preparedness is the right thing to do, but it can be hard to prioritize in the face of day-to-day tasks and seeming crises. However, recent events like the emergencies at water systems that have gained national attention and cyberattacks that have involved ransomware and attempts to access control systems should raise our awareness of the value of these efforts. Maybe this information can help you gain support in your utility to keep up with risk assessment and emergency planning activities, especially with respect to cybersecurity. It’s clear that assessing cybersecurity risks and planning to address those risks is part of SDWA, even though EPA’s early 2023 memorandum about cybersecurity and sanitary surveys was rescinded. 

Cybersecurity threats appear to be ever-changing and more threatening. Our Drinking Water Security Response Toolbox is designed to help you meet these AWIA requirements and keep your water systems safe and protected. 

Thank you.

➽ Ron Falco, P.E. Safe Drinking Water Program Manager

Marshall Fire Recovery Update

The Marshall Fire, the most destructive wildfire in Colorado history, devastated the cities of Louisville and Superior on December 30, 2021. As the impacted communities recover, CDPHE Water Quality Control Division is coordinating with the water systems to protect customers from potential cross connection issues at fire-damaged service taps. Water testing done by CDPHE and the water suppliers after the fire showed that extreme heat and damage to homes and structures caused by fire can create harmful contaminants such as VOCs. These harmful contaminants from the damaged water infrastructure can impact the water supply through connections to the supplier’s distribution system by backflow of contaminants into the supplier’s distribution system. 

For impacted connections where service was suspended, suppliers are consulting with the department before service can be returned. It is very important that customers do not reestablish water service to suspended service connections without approval by the supplier as it could cause potential contamination of the water system. To  return service to a fire-impacted connection, suppliers are performing one of the following actions:

1. Water quality sampling at the fire-impacted connection to ensure that no contaminants are present in the potable water supply. 
2. Installing an appropriate backflow prevention assembly at a non-impacted location to control the connection. The supplier must ensure that all installed backflow assemblies are tested by a certified cross-connection control technician upon installation. If a previously installed backflow assembly is suspected of being impacted by the fire, the assembly must be retested in order to confirm the connection is controlled.
3. Replacing all water supply infrastructure including the meter pit and entire service line. If all water supply infrastructure has been replaced, the supplier can follow normal protocols for supplying water to a new connection. The suppliers are informing the department when this process has been completed at an impacted location.

CDPHE WQCD continues to support the water suppliers as they rebuild their communities impacted by the Marshall Fire. Governor Polis expressed his deep appreciation for all the utilities and this appreciation is echoed by CDPHE.

➽ Heather Young, PE, CWP, Field Services Section Manager

➽ Clayton Moores, PE, Field Unit I Manager

Drinking Water Contamination Following Wildfires

In recent years we’ve seen an increase in frequency of wildfires occurring along wildland-urban interfaces across the western United States. Because of the increased incidence of wildfire causing large-scale loss of structures, more efforts by universities, water districts, and state regulators have been made to study the effects on drinking water infrastructure and the resulting water quality. When large-scale structure loss occurs, the type of chemical contamination that results is found primarily in the distribution system. Traditionally, most wildfire water quality concerns relate to source water contamination, especially when the wildfire primarily affects the watershed. However in recent years, contamination in distribution systems has also been observed. The distribution system chemical contamination being detected in some cases is made up of primarily volatile organic compounds (VOCs) such as benzene. Short term exposure to high concentrations of such chemicals is a public health concern.

By observing trends from the recent fires in California, Oregon, and Colorado, we have been able to determine factors that appear to lead to higher levels of VOC contamination. These factors include:

• A loss of pressure combined with burned structures and service connections
• Entry of smoke into broken or damaged water lines
• Plastic piping or other distribution system materials that have been exposed to high temperatures

In addition to observing factors that lead to contamination, there have also been important lessons learned that can help prevent or minimize contamination:

• Isolating damaged portions of the distribution system and service connections as soon as safely possible can prevent the spread of contamination
• Use unidirectional flushing when bringing damaged areas back on line and avoid flushing contaminated water through uncontaminated areas
• Contamination appears to be more severe in areas that experienced depressurization as well as damage. So extra caution should be taken when bringing these areas back on line. For example, issuing a drinking water advisory and completing additional sampling should be considered. 

In areas where depressurization occurs typical follow up sampling (coliform bacteria and disinfectant residual) should take place, as well as additional testing for VOCs. Water systems should work with CDPHE and their local public health agency to create a sampling plan that  identifies target contaminants, sample collection protocols, sampling locations (in the distribution system and surviving buildings), and data quality and management. 

In recent fires we have observed that contamination tends to absorb into distribution system piping and can leach out over time. Because of this, it is important to let the water stagnate, with no movement or flow in the line before sampling. Ideally, the stagnation period should be 72 hours but if that is not feasible shorter times are acceptable. 

Remediating VOC contamination can be a long term process. Flushing is the primary method of removal but at times, infrastructure replacement may be necessary. 

Don’t hesitate to reach out to us if you have any questions, would like more information on this topic, or would like any input on activities such as emergency planning and tabletop exercises. For additional information see the EPA’s guidance on Addressing Contamination of Drinking Water Distribution Systems from Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs) After Wildfires

➽ Chelsea Cotton, P.E. Source Water and Emerging Contaminants Engineer

Marshall Fire Response

Marshall Fire - December 30, 2021

On December 30, 2021, the most destructive wildfire* in recent Colorado history occurred. The Marshall Fire, a large grass fire east of Superior, Colorado, broke out in the mid-morning hours of December 30th.  Record winds at up to 100 mph and a very dry fall contributed to the conditions that allowed the fire to spread very quickly eastward toward the cities of Louisville and Superior. Figure 1 shows a very high level overview of the approximate fire starting location and the areas that were impacted in Superior and Louisville. Boulder County has maintained an incident website that summarized the total structures destroyed and the overall eventual perimeter of the fire.  Figure 2 shows a high level view of the fire’s extent and structures burned.

* Most Destructive in terms of property damage, not acres destroyed/burned.

An excerpt of the Boulder County Website Summarizes the damage as follows:

Residential Structures:

• City of Louisville: 550 structures destroyed, 43 structures damaged; actual value** of residential damage is approximately $229,199,184
• Town of Superior: 378 structures destroyed, 58 structures damaged; actual value of residential damage is approximately $152,757,462
• Unincorporated Boulder County: 156 structures destroyed, 48 damaged; actual value of residential damage is approximately $131,255,944
• Updated totals confirmed to date countywide are 1084 residential structures destroyed and 149 residential structures damaged. Total countywide actual value** of residential damage is estimated to be $513,212,589.

(**Boulder County Assessor is the source used to report actual value.)

Commercial Structures:

• City of Louisville: 4 structures destroyed, 14 structures damaged
• Town of Superior: 3 structures destroyed, 14 structures damaged
• Unincorporated Boulder County: 2 structures damaged

 Figure 1 - Overview of the area impacted  

 

Figure 2 - Boulder County summary of the structures damaged/destroyed

As the fires burned during the afternoon of December 30th, evacuations began occurring throughout the unincorporated area of Boulder County and the cities of Superior and Louisville.  Very quickly thereafter, structures began to burn in the two cities. Superior had large scale fires happening through the night of December 30th into the morning of December 31st. As the fire was raging, Town staff were shutting off curb stops at each burned property in an attempt to keep water available for fire fighting activities. However, with the speed of the fire, many fire-fighting locations were quickly evacuated and certain hydrants kept draining the system. As the fire continued, the city began losing pressure, and a boil advisory was issued for the entire city of Superior, affecting approximately 17,000 people.

During the same time, the city of Louisville also was battling to maintain water pressure throughout their high pressure zone due to multiple neighborhoods being destroyed. As the fire progressed, the city was under the threat of running out of water because of the number of hydrants running. Also, large scale power-outages were occurring to avoid further dangers as power poles were destroyed. Therefore, Louisville made the decision to allow water to gravity feed their system from their eastern-most water treatment plant, without any chemical treatment (coagulant or chlorine). With untreated raw surface water entering the system, the CDPHE issued a boil advisory for the entire City, affecting approximately 20,000 people.

Additionally in unincorporated Boulder County, the East Boulder County Water District was issued a boil advisory due to pressure loss and fire damage. Power outages also caused advisories that were not due directly to fire damage at several small water systems. It is important to remember that in these cases, the water districts could not have done anything differently to avoid these boil advisories. In fact, the water staff were heroically working to keep water flowing to help fight the ongoing fires while some of them had even lost their own homes. 

As the fires were extinguished and the mandatory evacuation orders were lifted, the public was anxious to get back into the area to begin the recovery process. It is important to note that each city individually did an excellent job on informing the public of the boil advisories. Boulder County was also instrumental in assisting with public communication and the media. 

During the first week of January, the public water systems worked very quickly and thoroughly to fully disinfect and flush their distribution system. There were over 150 miles of distribution pipes to flush. The water systems worked in close coordination with each other and with CDPHE to execute this flushing and disinfection. The advisories were lifted on January 6, 2022. The professionalism and dedication of the water operations staff at these utilities was excellent and commendable during this challenging event. The community and state owe a debt of gratitude to the utilities as they worked through the Marshall Fire event. Governor Polis expressed his deep appreciation for all the utilities did during this very challenging time.

Figure 3: Example of a destroyed neighborhood

Figure 4: Example of a partially destroyed 

After the immediate warning of the water being unsafe to drink was addressed, additional issues arose in the weeks following the fire. There were concerns about possible contamination from burned buildings, concerns about tastes and odors in parts of the water systems, and ongoing tracking of cross connections that was necessary.  Water utility staff were proactive in sharing information with their decision makers and the CDPHE, and the public was kept in the loop via the city websites as well as public meetings. 

In the coming weeks, we will publish additional information about the large-scale boil advisories and additional issues that have arisen as a result of the Marshall Fires and other events of 2021. These topics will include:

• How do you effectively warn thousands of people about a boil advisory?
• What if a portion of your community does not speak English? 
• Fires that burn primarily structures (as opposed to forests) may release VOCs!!  
• Cross connection tracking post-fire to avoid backflow events.

 ➽ Tyson Ingels, P.E Lead Drinking Water Engineer

Wildfire: Effects from recent fires and division resources

The 2021 fire season included three of the largest wildfires in Colorado’s history:

• Cameron Peak Fire
• East Troublesome Fire
• Pine Gulch Fire

Many other areas were impacted by wildfires also:

• Grizzly Creek Fire
• Williams Fork Fire 

These natural disasters have significant and long lasting impacts on water quality such as sediment/debris flows, decreased soil infiltration and erosion potential, and higher levels of nutrients and metals. The Water Quality Control Division (division) is one of many federal/state and local partners that provide resources and technical assistance when these impacts occur. The division response involves multiple disciplines including public water system acute team support, source water data sharing/evaluation and technical/financial assistance on watershed restoration efforts. 

These fires significantly impact watershed functions and necessitate collaborative work groups in impacted regions. One example is the Grizzly Creek State Recovery Task Force that is focused on the post wildfire effects in Glenwood Canyon and downstream on the Colorado River. In late July/early August of 2021, the post wildfire impacts caused mudslides and highway closures on the I-70 Glenwood Canyon corridor. The division is currently working with the Office of Emergency Management, Colorado Department of Transportation, Colorado Water Conservation Board, and a diverse range of local governments/stakeholders to develop a downstream notification system for Colorado River water users. This system is meant to provide downstream users on the Colorado River with early warning and notification of hazards and potential water quality impacts from watershed events and cleanup operations. This notification system will assist water users to make operational decisions to reduce impacts from the post wildfire conditions.

Other wildfire restoration activities involve the division’s Nonpoint Source (NPS) Program that has provided over $5 million in funding for wildfire related work in the past 20 years. Last year the Nonpoint Source Program’s Request for Applications provided priority points for post-wildfire projects and a waiver from the EPA for the watershed based plan requirement. This year the nonpoint source program is providing additional post-wildfire funding for 2022 projects thanks to the Power Authority Board. To provide context of the long-term process of restoration efforts, a recent Nonpoint Source Post-wildfire project success story is the Hayman Restoration Project. Horse Creek and West Creek were added to the 303(d) list of impaired waters for aquatic life due to post-fire flooding and erosion a decade after the Hayman fire. After the implementation of numerous best management practices, these waterbodies were successfully restored and removed from the 303(d) list for aquatic life in 2020. The NPS Program is also incorporating wildfire risk when prioritizing protection projects into it’s updated NPS Management Plan, such as a source water protection project in Southwest Colorado.

To further assist water providers, counties, tribes and municipalities impacted by wildfires, the Source Water and Emerging Contaminants Unit in the Water Quality Control Division worked with a large stakeholder group led by the City of Boulder Water Utilities Department to develop a Post-Fire Playbook. The playbook is a guidance document to help navigate the complexities surrounding post-fire rehabilitation. For the playbook and other post-fire resources please visit the post-fire playbook website.

 ➽  Kristen Hughes, Source Water Protection Specialist